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Abstract

Divorce law changes made in the 1970s affected marital formation, dissolution, and bargaining
within marriage. By altering the terms of the marital contract these legal changes impacted the
incentives for women to enter and remain in the labor force. Whereas earlier work had
suggested that the impact of unilateral divorce on female employment depended critically on
laws governing property division, I show that these results are not robust to alternative
specifications and controls. I find instead that unilateral divorce led to an increase in both
married and unmarried female labor force participation, regardless of the pre-existing laws
regarding property division.
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I.

Introduction
The 1970s witnessed two parallel changes: dramatic increases in the labor force

participation of women and changes in the laws governing marriage and divorce. This paper
assesses how the legal changes surrounding divorce contributed to the rise in women’s labor
force participation. Divorce laws change the value of exiting a marriage and thus potentially
change bargaining within the household. These laws may also change the returns to
specialization in household versus market production by reducing the amount of time women can
expect to spend in marriage and by increasing the returns to investing in one’s options outside of
marriage.
Research has shown that women increase their labor force participation in the years prior
to a divorce and that those who divorce have engaged in less household specialization (Johnson
and Skinner, 1986; Lundberg and Rose, 1999). These studies do not suggest that female labor
force participation causes divorce, but rather that the anticipation of a higher probability of
divorce increases female labor force participation.
It was this relationship between divorce and labor force participation that led scholars to
ask how the legal changes regarding the grounds for divorce may impact female labor force
participation. Family law underwent tremendous change in the 1960s and 1970s as states began
to consider reducing their role in divorce proceedings. In the first half of the 20th century, most
states required evidence of marital fault before allowing a marriage to be dissolved. Beginning
in the late 1960s, many states introduced “irreconcilable differences” as grounds for divorce;
effectively ushering in a period of unilateral divorce—divorce upon the request of either spouse.
In addition to the passage of unilateral divorce laws, many states removed fault as a
consideration in property division and some states changed laws governing property division
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subsequent to divorce. Currently, all but three states have some form of unilateral divorce and
two-thirds allow unrestricted unilateral divorce.
Early results presented in Peters (1986) based on cross-sectional comparisons suggested
that unilateral divorce led to a 2 percentage point rise in female labor force participation. Yet
these results were argued to be erroneous in Gray (1998) who found that unilateral divorce had
no independent effect on women’s market work. Instead Gray’s results suggested that unilateral
divorce laws had very different effects depending on the underlying property division laws.
Perhaps most strikingly, Gray interpreted these results as suggesting that women engage in
market work more when they gain bargaining power and less when they lose it. In contrast,
Chiappori, Fortin, and LaCroix (2002) estimated a structural model in which divorce laws enter
by shifting the bargaining positions of the spouses. They find that divorce laws that are
favorable to women reduce married women’s labor supply.
This paper revisits the question of how unilateral divorce impacts female labor force
participation and makes 4 key contributions. First, I replicate earlier analysis by Gray (1998)
using census data and propose a simple test for assessing the importance of property laws, rerunning Gray’s analysis separately for a group with substantial marital property—a home—and
for those without. These results cast doubt on Gray’s interpretation, as I find a decrease in
women’s labor force participation in states that adopted unilateral divorce where property laws
favor men occurs only among those who do not own a home. Second, I show that the expansion
of the dataset and the elimination of potentially endogenous individual level controls erode the
finding of a differential effect of unilateral divorce across states depending on their underlying
property division laws. Replacing these controls with controls for state-level policy and
demographic changes leads to a finding of a 1 percentage point rise in female labor force
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participation in states that adopt unilateral divorce. Third, I show that the impact of unilateral
divorce on female employment fades with marital duration indicating that divorce and shortened
marital duration are key contributors to women’s increased employment in unilateral divorce
states. Finally, I put these results in a longer run perspective by comparing female labor force
participation in states with and without unrestricted unilateral divorce over many decades. These
specifications more fully exploit the timing of unilateral divorce and show that the timing of the
rise in female labor force participation follows that of the legal change.
The results indicate that the incentives provided by unilateral divorce are independent of
how property is divided—in a regime in which any party can exit at will there is a greater
incentive to maintain one’s options outside of marriage. Women seeking both insurance against
divorce and greater bargaining power within marriage are thus more likely to engage in market
work when states allow unilateral divorce irrespective of the underlying property division laws.

II.

Divorce Reform and Married Women’s Labor Supply
Unilateral divorce fundamentally changes the nature of the marriage contract by allowing

either party to end the contract at will. This change impacts the bargaining position of each
spouse—shifting bargaining power toward the party with the greatest options outside the
marriage. Additionally, by allowing either spouse to leave unilaterally, unilateral divorce greatly
reduces the ability of couples to bargain inter-temporally. Indeed Stevenson (2007) finds that
newlywed couples in unilateral divorce states specialize less in their marriage and are less likely
to support each other’s human capital investments.
Divorce reform may affect female labor supply by changing women’s bargaining position
in the relationship, by changing the value of option’s outside of marriage to bargaining within

4

marriage, or by altering the returns to specialization within marriage (and thus the returns to
market versus non-market work). Previous work has shown that the divorce rate rose only
slightly with the adoption of unilateral divorce, but those who divorce do so quicker (Peters,
1986; Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006; Matouschek and Rasul 2008). Furthermore, marriage
rates are lower with unilateral divorce (Rasul 2006). In sum, the empirical results point toward
women spending more of their life outside of marriage in states with unilateral divorce and thus
have a greater incentive to acquire market skills.
The theory behind why the divorce rate is largely unchanged in the face of a change in
who has the right to divorce stems from the Coase theorem. Since the property right—the right
to divorce—is fully assigned in both cases, couples should bargain to reach the efficient
outcome. Regardless of whether both spouses must consent or whether one spouse can leave
unilaterally, divorces should only occur when the joint utility of the husband and wife divorced
exceeds that from remaining married. While the efficient outcome—divorce or remain
married—should be unchanged, there are important distributional changes. In the case of mutual
consent divorce, the person whose utility is greater if divorced must compensate their spouse in
order to make divorce preferable to remaining married for both of them, while under unilateral
divorce such a spouse would simply exit the marriage keeping all of the rents (if remaining
married was jointly optimal, then under unilateral divorce the spouse wishing to remain married
must compensates the spouse who prefers divorce, under mutual consent divorce no
compensation is needed). These distributional changes point to why in unilateral divorce states
there are greater incentives to preserve one’s options outside of marriage—the outside options
both set the relevant threat point for bargaining within marriage and determine the minimum
utility that one would receive in the wake of a divorce.

5

In Gray’s analysis he pointed to the role of laws regarding the division of property in
establishing the bargaining position of husbands and wives in the wake of unilateral divorce. He
classified each state into one of three largely stable regimes—equitable division, community
property, and common law—which differ in how much of the property is typically allocated to
the wife upon divorce. Gray’s interpretation was that women in states where the legal guidelines
lead them to receive small settlements at divorce lose bargaining power relative to their husbands
when the grounds for divorce change from mutual consent to unilateral. However, this is only
true if it is the husband who prefers to divorce. Indeed, under all types of property laws, women
whose relative utility is higher inside the marriage than is their husbands—i.e. who prefer to
remain married more than their husbands do—lose bargaining power to their husbands with a
switch to unilateral divorce. Laws regarding the division of property affect the legal parameters
for the division of assets; however these laws do not uniquely determine which spouse has a
higher value of exiting the relationship. If the woman prefers to divorce, then the passage of
unilateral divorce laws transfers bargaining power to her regardless of the underlying property
laws. If property division laws are stable during the transition to unilateral divorce, the shock to
bargaining is the transfer of the right to exit the marriage.
So how do we know whether women or men prefer to exit the marriage, and moreover
whether this varies by the laws regarding the division of property? Empirical work has found
that women are more likely to file for divorce: around two-thirds of those filing for divorce are
women. Brinig and Allen (2000) argue that one reason for this is because women have a greater
likelihood of gaining custody of their children. Men who value living with their children may
therefore value exiting the marriage less than their wife. Since property distribution laws do not
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apply to custody, concerns over custody may impact the value of exiting the marriage in a way
that is uncorrelated with property division laws.
Moreover, the shift in bargaining power toward the person most interested in exiting the
marriage changes the incentives for both married and unmarried women to acquire human capital
and labor market experience. These skills will now yield a greater return to women, even if they
ultimately exit the labor market, simply because they raise women’s outside options and thus
bargaining power within a marriage. However, the additional investment in human capital and
labor market experienced spurred by the increased value of one’s options outside of marriage
increases the opportunity cost of exiting the labor market. This combination of incentives and
bargaining jointly ensures that women will raise their labor force participation when divorce
laws are unilateral regardless of how property is divided upon divorce.

III.

Empirical Results
Much research has exploited the variation occurring from the fact that states differed in

the timing of their reforms to divorce law and that the reforms were considered routine policy
refinement, passed “with little notice or dissent” (Jacob, 1988). As a result, the timing of the
legislative changes have been considered to be independent of other social changes and therefore
provide a credible quasi-experimental setting in which to assess the causal relationship between
changing divorce laws and family outcomes.1
Many of these changes occurred in the early and mid-1970s. While the timing of divorce
1

Early research primarily focused on how unilateral divorce impacted the divorce rate (Peters 1986,
Parkman 1992, Peters 1992). This research has continued and with it so has our understanding of the
changes in divorce law. More recent research includes Wolfers (2006) who re-examines the impact of
unilateral divorce on the divorce rate, finding a small and transitory rise in divorce that dissipated within a
decade. Stevenson (2007) examines the impact of unilateral divorce on the behavior of newlyweds within
marriage, while Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) find that unilateral divorce reduces domestic violence and
suicide. Drewianka (2008) examines the impact of divorce laws on aggregate levels of fertility, finding
that unilateral divorce led to a small overall decline in fertility.
7

laws provides the possibility of more granular analysis that exploits the variation in the timing
across many years, the US census provides large, representative samples, albeit only every
decade. The empirical strategy using census data is to compare changes across states in the
employment of married women from 1970, when few states allowed unilateral divorce, to 1980,
by which time many states had adopted unilateral divorce, based on whether or not the state
adopted unilateral divorce.
The identification strategy can be illustrated using a simple two-by-two table that shows
the means in 1970 and 1980 of married women’s employment separately for states that had
adopted unilateral divorce by 1980 and states that had not. Table 1 shows these means along
with their differences. Women’s labor force participation in 1970 is lower in states that adopted
unilateral divorce, yet is higher in these states in 1980 compared with those states that did not
adopt it. The difference-in-difference estimate suggests that women’s employment rose 1.2
percentage points more in states that adopted unilateral divorce compared with those that did not,
however these results are imprecisely estimated.
This coarse comparison provides suggestive evidence of a rise in married women’s
employment in states that adopted unilateral divorce. Gray (1998), who also found imprecisely
estimated effects in a basic specification examining unilateral divorce on women’s employment,
further proposed breaking states down by the underlying property division in each state. We
now turn to replicating and extending Gray’s analysis using the 1970 and 1980 Censuses of
Population. For consistency, I start by following Gray’s coding of property division laws and his
coding of unilateral divorce laws in the following analysis.
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The primary regression he runs is a probit estimate of:
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where the β’s are the coefficients of interest. The effect of unilateral divorce is estimated
separately for the three property division regimes: common law, community property, and
equitable division. The same specification is also run replacing the three dummy variables with
a single indicator variable for unilateral divorce regardless of the type of property division. Gray
(1998) reports that one state in his sample changes from common law property division to
equitable division over this period; he therefore includes the direct effect of adopting equitable
property division in his regressions.2 Aside from state and year fixed effects, individual
characteristics are included as controls, although many of these controls may themselves be
changed by the adoption of unilateral divorce. For instance, existing research has shown an
effect of unilateral divorce on fertility (Drewianka, 2008). Husband’s income is particularly
problematic as husbands and wives labor supply are jointly determined, presumably by
household bargaining. Thus any policy change that impacts household bargaining may impact
both wives and husbands earnings. Including such controls provides estimates that do not reflect
any impact of unilateral divorce on women’s labor force participation that is mediated through
changes in these parameters.

2

I follow his sample which excludes 5 states that changed their divorce laws in the late 1970s. Only one
state in his sample changed from common law property division to equitable division during this period.
Thus equitable division is included as a control, common law is the excluded category, and community
property is collinear with the state fixed effects and is therefore not included. Following Gray, the
control for equitable division is not included when the three dummy variables for unilateral divorce are
replaced by a single indicator variable.
9

The first column of Table 2 reports Gray’s primary specification (his Table 3, columns 2
& 3).3 Panel A reports regressions where the independent variables of interest are three dummy
variables indicating whether a state has unilateral divorce with equitable division, common law,
or community property division laws. Panel B reports regressions where the three dummy
variables are replaced by a single dummy variable indicating whether the state has unilateral
divorce. The second column replicates this specification using the same 1 in 1000 Censuses
samples and follows his coding of both the dependent and independent variables.4 The
replication is nearly exact with coefficient estimates within rounding error at the third decimal
place.5
The next several columns investigate the hypothesis put forward by Gray that the
estimates of the response of married women’s labor supply to the adoption of unilateral divorce
is governed by how the state will divide property by considering the property that a couple owns.
The argument for why unilateral divorce affects women differently in common law states versus
equitable division or community property states is that men typically hold title to property in
common law states and thus have greater resources upon divorce. The most important asset that
most couples divide at divorce is their home (and this asset is also easily held only in the
husband’s name). Moreover, home owners simply have more assets on average than do renters.
As such, we would expect to see differences between home owners and renters in the impact of
unilateral divorce laws that vary by property regime, with the results shown in column 1 driven
by those who own property. What we see instead is that the negative relationship between
married women’s employment and the adoption of unilateral divorce in states with common law
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Gray (1998) reports t-statistics. I calculate the implied standard errors and show standard errors rather
than t-statistics.
4
ICPSR studies: 0018 and 8101.
5
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis, calculated to be consistent with Gray (1998).
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property division is driven largely by those who do not own a home. The change to unilateral
divorce leads to a statistically significant 10 percentage point decrease among renters in married
women’s employment in states with common law property division. In contrast, among home
owners unilateral divorce leads to a non-significant 2 percentage point fall. The coefficient on
unilateral divorce with community property is similar across the two groups and the coefficient
on unilateral divorce with equitable division is positive for both groups, albeit slightly larger for
renters. These findings point to the potential for there to be an omitted variable impacting
married women’s employment that is correlated with the adoption of unilateral divorce in the
three states—Florida, Georgia, and Alabama—that are included in the analysis as having both
common law property division and unilateral grounds for divorce in 1980.
Similarly, we can disentangle the effects by race. Column 5 shows a large negative effect
among blacks when unilateral divorce is adopted in states with common law property division—
a statistically significant decrease in married black women’s employment of 18 percentage
points. In comparison, among non-black married women the estimated coefficient indicates a
statistically insignificant fall of 1.2 percentage points. Among blacks there is also a small,
imprecisely estimated, fall in married women’s employment when unilateral divorce is adopted
by states with equitable division property division laws. Looking at community property states,
we see a large, 11 percentage point, rise in married black women’s employment when unilateral
divorce is passed. Among non-blacks there is a small increase in married women’s employment
in both community property and equitable division states that adopt unilateral divorce. These
unexpected and large differences in the estimated effects by race further point to the potential for
omitted variable bias to be impacting the results found in Gray (1998).6
6

In tables available from the author on request I investigate the labor force participation of never married
men ages 40 to 65. This employment of this group is unlikely to be unaffected by household bargaining
11

While many researchers have argued for the exogeneity of the adoption of unilateral
divorce laws as they were adopted around the country largely as a procedure refinement to
already existing divorce law, there have not been similar arguments made for the exogeneity of
property division laws. Furthermore, in parsing this effect out across the three property division
regimes there are fewer state changes to identify the effects, making it easier for other changes in
state policies to be spuriously correlated with the adoption of unilateral divorce. For instance,
among common law states, only 3 states changed their divorce laws to allow unrestricted
unilateral divorce; among community property states there are 5 that adopted unilateral divorce.
The majority of the states, 29, follow equitable division, of which 17 changed their divorce law
to allow unilateral divorce between 1970 and 1980.7 The few states with community property or
common-law property division laws may also have had other policy changes during the 1970s.
Abortion laws were changing, food stamp programs were being introduced and expanded, AFDC
varied and was changing, including AFDC for married couples through the AFDC-Unemployed
Parent program. If the adoption of any of these programs was correlated with the adoption of
unilateral divorce under particular divorce regimes then adding controls for these programs
would likely impact the estimated coefficient on unilateral divorce.
Table 3 seeks to reconsider Gray’s results. The first column expands the sample by using
a larger Census file, the 1 in 100 census files provided by IPUMS; these samples yield both more

changes instigated by the adoption of unilateral divorce. The coefficients for never-married men are
similar to those shown for married women. Between 1970 and 1980, employment of never-married men
increases in states with community property laws or equitable division laws that adopt unilateral divorce
and decreases in states that adopted unilateral divorce with common law property division. These
findings point to the importance of investigating omitted variable bias and sample selection effects
further.
7
Of these, Gray excludes from the analysis four of the states that adopted unilateral divorce because their
law changes occurred in the latter part of the 1970s.
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observations and ensure uniform coding of variables across the years.8 Additionally, I exclude
controls for potentially endogenous individual-level variables. Since these controls are
themselves are likely impacted by unilateral divorce, holding them constant will bias the
coefficient on unilateral divorce.9 Instead, by eliminating these controls, the coefficient on
unilateral divorce will instead capture the aggregate impact of unilateral divorce on married
women’s employment.10
The results reported in the first column show that using the larger sample and dropping
the potentially endogenous variables attenuates the estimated coefficients (the remaining
individual level controls include a quadratic for age, a saturated set of dummy variables for
educational attainment, and race).11 Panel A shows a negative relationship between married
women’s employment and unilateral divorce in common law states and a positive relationship
for unilateral divorce in equitable and community property division states and Panel B shows no
statistically significant effect of unilateral divorce when the effect is not allowed to vary by
property laws. The second column adds controls for time-varying factors at the state-level, such
as the natural log of state personal income per capita, age composition variables indicating the
share of states’ populations aged 26-40, 41-55, 56-65, and over 65, the share of the state’s
8

This includes correcting the coding of race. Gray coded Hispanics in only states sharing a border with
Mexico as non-white in 1970 and all Hispanics were coded as non-white in 1980. This derives from
using two different variables—Spanish surname and Hispanic—to define white. Since Hispanic is
available for 1970 and 1980 a consistent coding is available for these two periods.
9
For example, unilateral divorce has been shown to reduce the likelihood of having a small child in the
home (Stevenson, 2007). Because women with small children tend to work less, unilateral divorce may
lead to an increase in employment through its impact on the probability of having a child. Controlling for
children in the home in this case will lead the coefficient on unilateral divorce to be biased downward.
10
While having small children in the home and husband’s income both impact married women’s labor
supply, neither of these factors are likely to be correlated ex ante with whether or not a state adopted
unilateral divorce, i.e. their exclusion only impacts the coefficient on unilateral because of the causal
influence of unilateral divorce on these variables. As such, excluding these variables eliminates the
edogeneity bias.
11
The larger sample size highlights the need to cluster the standard errors at the level of exogenous
variation. Robust standard errors are all very small. Instead Table 3 uses standard errors clustered at the
state-year level.
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population that is black, the share that are immigrants, and the male unemployment rate. The
estimated effects in Panel A are now all positive, albeit not statistically significant. Panel B
shows an effect of unilateral divorce on married women’s labor supply of 0.5 percentage points
that is imprecisely measured and thus would allow effects in either direction.
The third column adds controls for time-varying state-level policies such as the presence
of a food stamp program, the presence of welfare for families with an unemployed parent, the
maximum AFDC rate for a family of four, and whether a state allows abortion. Both Panels A &
B now show statistically significant increases in married women’s labor force participation of
about 1 percentage point when unilateral divorce is adopted—regardless of the underlying laws
governing property division at divorce. Breaking this effect across the three property regimes
shows coefficient estimates that are similar across the three types of property laws.12 The next
column includes the states that were dropped from Gray’s analysis: Massachusetts, Montana,
Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Missouri (Gray dropped them because they changed their divorce
laws in the mid 1970s and therefore had less time to impact behavior). The estimated
coefficients are little changed when these states are included and the precision of the estimates
increases slightly.
The next few columns show that the large differences in the effect of unilateral divorce
estimated for renters versus non-renters and blacks versus non-blacks that were evident in Table
2 are no longer evident once controls are added for time-varying state-characteristics. While the
estimates for renters and blacks are smaller than those for home owners and non-blacks, the
estimates for renters and blacks are very imprecisely estimated. As such, there are not
statistically significant differences between renters and owners or between blacks and non12

While the coefficient estimate is large and more precisely estimated among the equitable division states
that adopted unilateral divorce, the unilateral coefficients are not statistically significantly different from
one another.
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blacks. While it is plausible that unilateral divorce may have a differential impact by race or
home ownership—for instance, women with higher earnings potential should be more likely to
increase their labor supply in the face of the incentives provided by unilateral divorce—these
estimates do not allow any such inferences to be drawn.
Note that the magnitude of the final estimate of the impact of unilateral divorce on
married women’s employment is similar to what was seen in the simple differences-indifferences table. Tables 2 and 3 point to the problem of omitted variable bias in determining
whether unilateral divorce impacted married women’s labor force participation. As such, they
also illustrate the difficulty of attempting to sort out differences in the impact of unilateral
divorce among the few states that followed a property division rule different from that of
equitable division.
An additional difficulty may stem from the fact that states were making many changes
regarding the division of property upon divorce during this period. The division of states into
one of three categories followed by Gray (1998) is further complicated by differing
interpretations of the relevant changes in divorce law that occurred over this period. The coding
of whether a state adopted unilateral divorce as grounds for divorce is reasonably straightforward
with disagreement among scholars occurring only for a handful of states. Replacing the
definition of unilateral divorce with that followed in Gruber (2004) or Friedberg (1998) yields
qualitatively similar results.
In contrast, there are sharply differing classifications of the regimes governing property
division. Gray (1998) codes all states as falling into one of three property division regimes:
common law, community property, and equitable division. However, this division ignores
whether a state had eliminated fault from consideration in property division. No-fault property
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division did not occur simultaneously with unilateral divorce. Indeed many of the states that
allowed unilateral divorce retained fault as a consideration in the division of property (Jacob,
1988). Among Gray’s classification, none of the common law states adopting unilateral divorce
had adopted no-fault property division by 1980, while 4 of the community property and 12 of the
equitable division did. Additional classifications come from Jacob (1988), who goes through
property division laws finding that, by 1983, 22 states had a provision to value the homemaking
contribution of spouses, 19 states had “unequivocally eliminated fault from consideration in
property division” (p.121), and 5 states had switched to “equal” distribution, 5 were ambiguous,
while the remainder followed equitable division. Examining the effects of unilateral divorce
among all of these differing schemes yields largely similar findings to those seen thus far—in
most cases unilateral divorce leads to approximately a 1 percentage point rise in women’s labor
force participation regardless of the underlying rules governing the division of property.
Beyond the complex, and sometimes conflicting, coding of property division laws,
isolating the effects of unilateral divorce separately for each type of property division law is
difficult because these laws affect only a few states. As such, the rest of this paper will focus on
further examining the effect of unilateral divorce on female labor force participation without
attempting to separate the effects by differing types of property division.
Table 4 considers whether selection into and out of marriage affects the estimates of the
effect of unilateral divorce on married women’s labor force participation by examining the
impact of unilateral divorce on married women’s employment separately by marital duration.
The estimates show that unilateral divorce has the largest impact on the labor force participation
of women married 5-15 years, the period during which many marriages are most likely to end.
This relationship suggests that the threat of divorce may be playing a role in the relationship
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between unilateral divorce and whether married women work. Alternatively, women in long
duration marriages, in the decade following unilateral divorce’s passage, may be older and have
lower labor market opportunities as well as fewer remaining years from which to benefit from
entering the labor force.13
Thus far our examination of the impact of unilateral divorce on women’s labor force
participation has focused on the years soon after states adopted unilateral divorce. However,
unilateral divorce impacts both the selection of spouses into marriage and the duration of
marriage. As such these effects may either diminish or grow over time as people adapt to the
new marital environment. Figures 1a and 1b show the aggregate labor force participation rates
of married and all women respectively using annual data from the March CPS from 1968 to
1995. These figures show that female labor force participation rose in the mid-1970s in states
that adopted unilateral divorce relative to those that did not (while states vary in the timing of
adoption, states are simply grouped into those that adopt unilateral divorce and those that do
not). This rise for married women appears to last about 10 years. In contrast, the labor force
participation rates for all women rose and remain about 2 percentage points higher in unilateral
divorce states. This difference reflects the greater labor force participation rates for unmarried
women as well as married women. This result is consistent with the fact that unilateral divorce
has been shown to cause a lower likelihood of marriage, a higher probability of working during
marriage, and a shorter expected marital duration. As a result, unmarried women in unilateral
divorce states have a greater incentive to invest in market skills compared to women in states
without unilateral divorce.

13

While the regressions control for age, there may be differential effects of unilateral divorce on women’s
labor supply by age.
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These figures suggest that the timing in the difference in female employment between
unilateral divorce states and those without unilateral divorce is suggestive of the role of unilateral
divorce in increasing employment. To test further whether the timing evidence supports a role
for unilateral divorce in increasing female labor force participation we now turn to regression
analysis. The difficulty of establishing a relationship between unilateral divorce and marital
outcomes given pre-existing differences among states in trends in norms and behavior regarding
marriage has led scholars to examine data sets that cover a long period and allow the dynamic
response of the policy change to be explicitly mapped out by including leads and lags for
unilateral divorce. The ideal data for such an analysis is annual data which contain
representative samples of women in each state of the United States. While the Current
Population Survey (CPS) provides such data for recent years, the CPS grouped several states
together during the 1970s reducing the number of state-years available for analysis. In particular,
several states are grouped together between 1968 and 1972 and others are grouped together
between 1973 and 1976. Only around a quarter of the states are separately identified over the
entire period. I use all available state-years in the regressions shown in Table 5; however the
results are similar when I include only states that can be individually identified each year
between 1968 and 1995.
Table 5 examines these results exploiting the variation that comes from differences across
states in the timing of the adoption of unilateral divorce. The specification in the first column
examines the relationship between unilateral divorce and the employment of all women. By
looking at all women, the total effect on women’s employment is assessed—that stemming from
changes in the incentives women face before, during, and after marriage, as well as that
stemming from changes in marital duration and timing. The second column adds state-level
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aggregate controls. Both columns show a clear rise in female labor force participation that
begins a few years after unilateral divorce is adopted. Adding controls increases the estimated
coefficients and sharpens the estimates. Both specifications suggested that within 5 years of
unilateral divorce female employment has risen by around 2 percentage points.
Columns 3-4 in Table 5 show a less consistent pattern for married women. As was seen
in the earlier tables, the relationship between unilateral divorce and married women’s
employment is sensitive to the inclusion of state-level aggregate controls. The first column does
not include controls for other time-varying state-level factors and we see a small and
insignificant effect of unilateral divorce on married women’s labor supply. Adding controls
leads to statistically significant increase of around 2 percentage points that is not seen in the
years leading up to unilateral divorce and grows following the adoption of unilateral divorce.

IV.

Conclusion
This paper examines how changing the laws governing divorce and property division

changes women’s labor supply decisions. Divorce laws change the value of exiting the marriage
and thus potentially change bargaining within the household. These laws may also change the
returns to specialization in household production by reducing the amount of time women can
expect to spend in marriage and by increasing the returns to investing in one’s options outside of
marriage. By increasing the value of the option outside of marriage, unilateral divorce increases
the return to acquiring experience and other human capital for women before, during, and after
marriage.
In earlier work Gray (1998) argued that there was no direct effect of unilateral divorce on
female labor supply; rather the impact of unilateral divorce depends on the prevailing laws
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governing property division. This paper shows that the inability to find an effect of unilateral
divorce on female labor supply in this earlier analysis reflected omitted variable bias and
heterogeneity in treatment for women based on marital duration. Moreover, the small number of
states following common law property division and adopting unilateral divorce makes the
finding of a negative effect on female employment in these states very sensitive to the sample
and specification used.
This paper adds a richer set of controls for state level time-varying factors and finds that
adding these controls yields estimates that imply an effect of unilateral divorce on female
employment that is invariant across differing legal regimes for the division of property at
divorce. These findings suggest that unilateral divorce led to a 1 percentage point rise in female
employment. Considering martial duration leads to estimates that are double for those in the
earlier years of marriage, with little effect found for those married for 15 years or longer.
However, these effects reflect only couples in the years immediately following the adoption of
unilateral divorce. Examining 25 years of data shows an increase in female employment for both
married and unmarried women following unilateral divorce that reaches its peak about 5 years
after unilateral divorce is adopted and remains about 2 percentage points higher than that in
states that did not adopt unilateral divorce. These findings point to divorce reform’s broader
impact on the behavior of individuals both within and outside of marriage.
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Table 1
Mean of Married Women’s Employment in States Adopting and Not Adopting Unilateral Divorce
Adopted unilateral divorce Did not adopt unilateral divorce
Difference
between 1970 and 1980
between 1970 and 1980
.657
.654
.008
Married Women’s Employment
(.006)
(.012)
(.014)
in 1980
.542
.550
-.004
Married Women’s Employment
(.006)
(.010)
(.013)
in 1970
.115
.103
Difference
.012
(.009)
(.017)
(.019)
Notes: The coding of unilateral divorce follows Gray (1998). There are 25 states that are coded as adopting unilateral divorce between
1970 and 1980. The remaining 25 states and the District of Columbia do not. Married women’s employment is estimated from the US
census which asks women whether they were employed in the previous year. Data are aggregated at the state level. Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis. The bottom right cell gives the difference-in-difference estimate.
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Table 2
Female Employment and the Adoption of Unilateral Divorce with Different Property Division Laws: Comparing Effects for
Different Groups
Black
Non-black
Gray
Replication
Renters
Home
(AER 1998)
Owners

Panel A
Unilateral divorce w/
common law
Unilateral divorce w/
equitable distribution
Unilateral divorce w/
community property
Panel B
Unilateral
Sample size

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-.036
(.015)
.013
(.010)
.023
(.012)

-.037
(.016)
.013
(.011)
.024
(.012)

-.100
(.032)
.023
(.021)
.023
(.021)

-.017
(.018)
.009
(.012)
.028
(.014)

-.178
(.046)
-.026
(.048)
.113
(.043)

-.012
(.017)
.011
(.011)
.022
(.012)

.006
(.008)
63,615

.006
(.008)
63,615

-.000
(.016)
16,842

.008
(.010)
46,622

-.053
(.031)
4,977

.010
(.009)
58,631

Notes: All columns report Probit estimates, evaluated at the cell mean. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regression specification
follows Gray (1998):
E m p lo ye d i , s , t = α + β 1 U n ila tera l w / co m m o n la w s , t + β 2 U n ila te ra l w / co m m u n ity s , t + β 3 U n ila te ra l w / eq u ita b le s , t + δ E q u ita b le D ivisio n s,t + χ H o u seh o ld n o n la b o r in co m e i , s , t +
2

φ H u sb a n d 's In co m e i , s , t +

∑ ϕ k (K id s E v er B o rn

i , s ,t

) k + γ A n y kid s u n d er 6 i , s , t + η A g e i , s , t + µ W h ite i , s , t + ξ E d u c a tio n i , s , t + ψ U rb a n i , s , t + λ Yea r o f C en su s t +

k =1

∑η

s

S ta te s + ε i , s , t

s

where the β’s are the coefficients of interest. Panel A reports the effect of unilateral divorce estimated separately for the three property division
regimes: common law, community property, and equitable division. Panel B reports the effect of a single dummy variable for unilateral divorce.
Controls include state and year fixed effects, a dummy for non-Hispanic white (Hispanics were not identified in most states prior to 1980), a
dummy for urban status, non-labor household income, husband’s income, number of children ever born, children ever born squared, any children
under 6, years of education, age. Data are from the 1970 and 1980 US census; the dependent variable measures whether a woman reported having
worked in the year prior to the census.
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Table 3
Female Employment and the Adoption of Unilateral Divorce with Different Property Division Laws: State-Level Controls
Minimal
controls
(1%
Sample)

+Aggregate
state-level
demographic
controls

+Aggregate
state-level
policy
controls

+Excluded
states

Renters

Home
Owners

Black

NonBlack

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Panel A
Unilateral divorce w/
common law

-.010
(.004)

.001
(.008)

.009
(.010)

.009
(.009)

-.002
(.018)

.010
(.009)

.012
(.011)

.011
(.011)

Unilateral divorce w/
equitable distribution

.005
(.007)

.009
(.007)

.015
(.009)

.016
(.007)

.006
(.010)

.018
(.008)

-.021
(.020)

.016
(.007)

Unilateral divorce w/
community property

.004
(.003)

-.003
(.007)

.008
(.011)

.008
(.011)

.009
(.018)

.006
(.006)

-.049
(.029)

.008
(.012)

.001
(.004)

.005
(.005)

.012
(.007)

.013
(.006)

.004
(.010)

.016
(.006)

-.009
(.013)

.014
(.006)
























656,375


656,375


695,488


185,876


509,612


51,755


643,725

Panel B
Unilateral

Reduced set of controls
State-level demographic
controls
State-level policy controls
Sample size

656,375

Notes: All columns report Probit estimates, evaluated at the cell mean. Standard errors clustered at the level of the state-year are in parentheses.
The regression follows the specification in Table 2 however the controls are now varied across columns 1-3. In column 1, the reduced set of
controls include dummy variables for white and black, a quadratic for age, a saturated set of dummy variables for education, along with state and
year fixed effects. In column 2, state-level demographic controls for age composition variables indicating the share of states’ populations aged 2640, 41-55, 56-65, and over 65, the share of the state’s population that is black (except for columns 7 & 8), the share of the state’s population that
are immigrants, the natural log of state personal income per capita, and the unemployment rate are also included. Finally, in column 3 state-level
policy controls for the maximum AFDC rate for a family of four, existence of the AFDC unemployed parent and food stamp programs, and the
Donohue and Levitt coding of whether a state has abortion access are added. Columns 4-8 included the full set of controls as included in column
3. Data are from the 1970 and 1980 US census; the dependent variable measures whether a women reported having worked in the year prior to the
census.
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Table 4
Female Employment and the Adoption of Unilateral Divorce with Different Property
Division Laws: Heterogeneity and Selection
Married 5
Married 5Married 11- Married
years or less 10 years
15 years
more than 15
years
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Unilateral
.006
.025
.020
.004
(.008)
(.010)
(.011)
(.006)
{.007}
{.007}
{.008}
{.007}



State-level aggregate
controls and reduced
individual level
Sample size
125,050
100,499
89,211
Notes: All columns report Probit estimates, evaluated at the cell mean.


283,765

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the level of the state-year
are in curly brackets.
The reduced set of controls includes dummy variables for white and black, a quadratic for age, a
saturated set of dummy variables for education, along with state and year fixed effects.
State-level aggregate controls include the maximum AFDC rate for a family of four, existence of
the AFDC unemployed parent and food stamp programs, the natural log of state personal income
per capita, the unemployment rate, age composition variables indicating the share of states’
populations aged 26-40, 41-55, 56-65, and over 65, the Donohue and Levitt coding of whether a
state has abortion access, and the share of the state’s population that is black, white and other.
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Table 5
Effects of Unilateral Divorce on Female Employment

Column No

All Women
(1)

(2)

Married Women
(3)
(4)

1-3 years prior to change

-.004
(.008)

-.005
(.008)

-.003
(.010)

.000
(.009)

Year of change

-.002
(.010)

.008
(.010)

-.002
(.013)

.017
(.010)

1-3 years later

.010
(.008)

.012
(.008)

.001
(.010)

.017
(.008)

4-6 years later

.016
(.007)

.023
(.008)

.010
(.008)

.027
(.008)

7-9 years later

.015
(.007)

.023
(.008)

.006
(.010)

.026
(.008)

10 years or more later

.016
(.008)

.026
(.008)

.004
(.010)

.027
(.009)








Control variables
State and year fixed effects
Economic, demographic and
social policy controls#
Sample




All states
All states
1968-1995
1968-1995
(some state-years missing)
(some state-years missing)
1116
1116
Sample size
Dependent variable is the aggregate female employment rate in the state. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
#

Controls include the maximum AFDC rate for a family of four; existence of the AFDC

unemployed parent and food stamp programs; the natural log of state personal income per capita,
the unemployment rate; age composition variables indicating the share of states’ populations
aged 14-19; and then ten-year cohorts beginning with age 20 up to a variable for 90+; the
Donohue and Levitt Effective access; and the share of the state’s population that is black, white
and other. (Employment status, age and race data are constructed from Unicon’s March CPS
files, and refer to the population aged 14 years or greater.)
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